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CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MEDICAL EXPERTS
LESLIE H. VOGEL
N THE PAST

quarter century we have experienced marked and in

some respects revolutionary changes in most of the things that
affect human relationships. The change in the economy of the
country and the impact upon it of governmental authority is striking.
We have passed from a government, to a large extent, in the hands of
the "home folks" to a centralized government upon which local subdivisions have little effect. Great changes in most of the endeavors by
which our people earn their daily bread have been accomplished. It is
only necessary to point to the authority of the central government
which, in large measure, controls the daily life of the farmer to establish this transition.
The "liberal" thinking on these economic and social questions has
had its effect upon the practice of the law. This is particularly true
with respect to common law claims for personal injuries and wrongful death. Rules that once were considered to be the positive and unchanging declarations of human rights and obligations have been so
changed as to amount almost to destruction. The rule of stare decisis
no longer commands its former respect and adherence. Today it is a
practical impossibility for a lawyer to advise a client on his rights and
liabilities under a given state of facts with assurance that tomorrow
the rules upon which reliance was placed will not be changed. In
many respects the law today is what some judge says it is. Tomorrow
we may find it to be the contrary by pronouncement of the same or
some other court of equal authority.
In substantial part, this uncertainty and lack of confidence in the
stability of the law has resulted in settlements of the vast majority of
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common law personal injury claims. Insurance companies and large

entities constantly faced with numerous claims for injury have come
to the belief that in the courts of most of the jurisdictions "liability
follows injury." Another way of putting the same thing is that "the
preponderance of evidence is with the empty pant's leg." That small
percentage of personal injury claims that eventually reach the stage
of trial present in most, if not all, cases the principal issue of the character and extent of the injury.
In this posture of personal injury litigation, it is evident that medical
testimony assumes more and more an important, if not controlling,
position in the cases tried. It therefore behooves counsel who devote a
substantial part of their time to this type of the practice to become
fully conversant with all phases of medical science relating to injuries.
A rule of cross-examination which admits of no exception is exemplified by the old "saw" which tells us that to train a dog we must know
more than the dog.
Upon the foundation of a general education in and knowledge of
the elements of medical science relating to trauma, there must be
thorough and unrelenting preparation on the particular medical questions presented by each individual case. This special preparation may
profitably begin with the selection of a specialist in the field of medicine involved. An effective method of acquiring and utilizing the necessary knowledge should begin with the preparation of a careful summary of the available information relating to the precise injury and
the claims made by the injured party. This summary should then be
submitted to the expert for study, following which conferences should
be held covering each item which is validly subject to dispute. Careful
lawyers supplement such conferences with a close study of all of the
available texts recognized by the profession and articles by qualified
specialists in the field in question. Given this character of preparation
after an intelligent analysis of the medical question, any expert who
appears for the opposition must be an expert indeed to approach the
courtroom with a broader understanding of the immediate subject
than the cross-examiner.
The summary of the medical questions and the suggested conferences with the specialist must be founded upon facts obtained in a
proper, careful investigation. Too often such an investigation is left
wholly to subordinates or investigators for the client. Hospital records, nurses' notes, doctors' notations of diagnosis, and even the direc-
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tions for medication, should have the closest scrutiny. It has become a
general practice to delegate the obtaining of the hospital records to
agencies who furnish photostatic copies of the same. This practice has
its values, but it is a poor substitute for an examination of the original
by the counsel who shall be the cross-examiner of the opposing experts. Frequently photostatic copies are indistinct. It is a notorious
fact that doctors generally are unable to write legibly. Abbreviations
sometimes are peculiar to the individual physician. It is only by a close
inspection of the original documents, with an insistence upon an interpretation of entries not fully understood, that the entire medical picture as presented by hospital records can be made clear.
In what respects are hospital records of importance in the preparation for cross examination? Countless illustrations of the exceptional
value of a complete knowledge and understanding of such records are
available. Take, for example, the hypothetical case of a middle-aged
woman who has suffered a head injury in an accident. Assume a brief
period of unconsciousness and a claim to post-concussional syndrome.
In the posed illustration, the patient complained of nervousness, headaches, and associated subjecitve symptoms, which an expert, called to
give hypothetical testimony, can well testify are consistent with a
diagnosis of residual disability which could be caused by the head injury. Now assume the hospital record shows the regular administration
by the attending physician of estrogen or some related medication for
menopausal syndrome. The history shows that prior to the occurrence, there was an irregular and interrupted menses. With such a picture and with an understanding that most of the post-concussional
symptoms are likewise symptoms of menopausal syndrome, the expert can then with safety be cross-examined with an assurance that the
very least which can be exacted from him is an admission that it is just
as likely that the plaintiff is suffering from menopausal syndrome as it
is that she is suffering from the results of a head injury and concussion.'
To illustrate further, in a case in which the attending physician not
only furnished the factual foundation but also testified hypothetically,
it was claimed that the plaintiff, an elderly lady, had sustained a permanent disabling injury to a hip. An examination of the hospital

I No cross examination should include a statement to a witness of assumed facts unless
the cross-examiner is able fully to prove such facts. Gordon v. Checker Taxi Co., 334
Il. App. 313, 316-18, 320-21, 79 N.E. 2d 632 (1948).
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record showed from the x-rays, thc clinical charts, and the diagnoses
that the original injury had in fact occurred. There was little in a
careful examination of the principal records, either to support or
refute the claim of permanency or of disability. As was invariably true
in the hospital in question, the attending physician was required to
indicate the time of discharge of the patient and such patient's condition at that time. This physician was a careless writer, and on the last
page of the hospital record appeared a writing in his hand. The investigator was unable to decipher the term with any assurance of accuracy.
One of the supervisory nurses was called upon to interpret the writing
and it developed to be "Discharged June 26, 1948, cured." Upon the
trial the attending physician was cross examined with reference to his
opinion, given hypothetically, that the plaintiff had sustained the permanent disability.
When questioned on cross-examination, the doctor was asked
whether or not in the course of his practice he used the term "cured."
He conceded that it was a common word that he frequently used in
connection with his treatment of patients. He was then asked what
was his definition of the term. He defined the term as "made well,"
''no longer suffering from the disease or injury which laid the patient
low," and "without symptoms." His attention was then drawn to his
notation on the hospital record. He conceded that he had written it
and attempted to explain. It will be evident that no explanation of
such a record could salvage the plaintiff's claim to extensive, permanent injury.
A further example of the certain benefit to result from a careful review of all hospital data is found in the case of the roentgenologist,
who testified from innumerable x-ray films in a case involving an
alleged fracture of the cuboid bone in the ankle of a lady plaintiff. It
was claimed that serious permanent disability resulted from the original injury, including an osteoporosis of the bones in and adjacent to
the ankle. In the course of the treatment, comparative films were taken,
several of the left ankle, which was the injured one, and several of the
right ankle. On two or three of the films the marking identifying the
particular ankle portrayed was exceedingly dim. The cross-examiner
believed that the expert had made an impression on the jury favorable
to his contention. Just before the adjournment for the noon recess, the
witness was handed two films of the right ankle which required close
scrutiny to determine whether they were marked with the "R" indi-
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cating the right, or the "L" indicating the left. Probably because the
expert believed that he had made a favorable impression upon the jury,
or that he had found the cross-examiner was stupid, or merely from
sheer hunger, he became careless and began a dissertation to the jury
from the two films, pointing out the points of alleged injury, the thinness of the bone structure typical of porosis, and other evidence supporting his opinion. When this learned discussion ended, his attention
was called to the fact that he had been reading from films showing the
uninjured ankle. Adjournment immediately followed, and there was
no further examination, direct or cross, following the noon recess.
An example of the failure intimately to know the hospital records in
detail is found in the case recently tried in which the plaintiff on crossexamination with regard to his injuries made numerous conflicting
and contradictory statements. The clear inference and implication was
that he was a person unworthy of credit and belief. In an effort to rehabilitate his client, plaintiff's counsel asked him on re-direct examination the improper question, "Mr. X, do you attend church?" The obvious purpose was to establish that the plaintiff was a church-goer,
therefore in fear of the Lord and one not likely, by reason thereof, to
commit perjury. Because of a lack of detailed study of the hospital
records, the cross-examining counsel objected to this clearly improper
question and the objection was sustained. Subsequently, on studying
the hospital records for another purpose, it was discovered that on
seven separate occasions, to different internes or house physicians in
hospitals, the plaintiff in answer to the question "Religion?" had
stated: "Atheist." It is obvious that had the cross-examiner been conversant with the hospital record in detail the objection would not have
been made, and on re-cross examination the plaintiff could have been
further destroyed had he attempted to pose as a churchgoer.
At this point a word of caution seems to be indicated. In the foregoing paragraphs, it has been emphasized that records of the treatment, diagnosis, and other pertinent data with relation to the plaintiff's injury are important in determining the character and the extent
of the plaintiff's alleged injury. Sometimes, upon the trial of a cause,
an attending physician will be asked to produce his personal clinical
records. Unless, by prior discovery proceedings in those jurisdictions
where such practice is authorized, the cross-examiner has obtained
copies of such records and had an opportunity to examine the same,
this is a dangerous practice. Laymen generally consider the family
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doctor, with all of his lack of precise learning in the several specialties
of medicine, to be more reliable than the vaunted experts and specialists. If the personal records of the family physician disclose a discrepancy from the hospital record, a jury is much more likely to
credit such testimony based upon the recollection of the witness refreshed from his personal record than that of the hospital. Moreover,
having called for the record on cross-examination, the same is available
to opposing counsel, and, generally, opposing counsel may go all
through the record on re-direct examination to establish that complaints or symptoms or objective findings claimed for the plaintiff but
otherwise unsupported were in fact recorded by the family doctor.
A further word of caution seems to be appropriate. Many years ago
laymen, from whose ranks jurors are selected, had little knowledge or
understanding of medical terms or procedures. In those days, frequently a cross-examiner endeared himself to the twelve talesmen by
professing, either truthfully or untruthfully, a complete lack of
knowledge or understanding of the "mysteries" of the testimony of
the "blood letters" who had pontificated upon the trial. Sometimes, in
the olden days, the greater the ignorance professed the more favorable
was the impression created. Not so today. We have become a medically conscious people, and it is only the most illiterate of our citizens
who have not heard of the "wonder" drugs either by name or by their
announced efficacy in the treatment of disease. Few people subject to
jury service are today in doubt of the meaning of "anesthetic," "anesthesia," "fracture," "concussion" and other more complex medical expressions. From this, it seems clear that the cross-examiner who does
no more than profess an ignorance of medical terms receives and, indeed, is entitled to, no sympathy from reasonably intelligent jurors. It
is not intended by this suggestion to imply that the cross-examiner
should use phrases unlikely to be known to a juror. It is vastly better
that all terms used by a physician who may be testifying be explained
2 The use of hospital records in the cross-examination of medical witnesses is in many
cases substantially limited. In some cases it has been held that before the record may be
used for cross-examination it must appear that the medical witness himself prepared and
signed the record page. It is thought, however, that where the witness admits his approval of the record and has knowledge of it, the ambit of cross-examination includes
such portions, despite the fact that the record was not prepared or signed by the wit-

ness. Smith v. Johnson, 2 Ill. App. 2d 315, 319, 320, 120 N.E. 2d 58 (1954); Wiedow v.

Alden Carpenter, 310 Ill. App. 342, 347, 34 N.E. 2d 83 (1941); Flynn v. Troesch, 373 Ill.
275, 282, 26 N.E. 2d 91 (1940); Branch v. Woulfe, 300 Ill. App. 472, 477, 21 N.E. 2d 148

(1939); Wright v. Upson, 303 Ill. 120, 143-45, 135 N.E. 209 (1922).
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in laymen's language, except those which it is expected will have common understanding among laymen. Quite certainly, an effort to use
unfamiliar and highly technical terms without explanation by a crossexaminer is likely to result disastrously if for no other reason than that
it appears he is attempting to "talk down" to his peers.
It has truthfully been said of the right of cross-examination that it
furnishes the most certain defense against perjury and chicanery upon
the trial of a cause. There are some in past years and presently who
advocate the abolition of the jury system and thus the abandonment
of those guarantees against injustice which are inherent in the adversary proceeding which we today know as the jury trial. These individuals conceive that there is some type or method by which the stories
of all persons concerned in a legal dispute may be dropped in a hopper, a crank turned, and the God-given truth of the issue will result.
No more fallacious, untutored and inexperienced view of the just settlement of questions between citizens could be advanced,
Intelligent cross-examination cannot fail to develop -truth. Jury
verdicts are responsive to a clear understanding of that truth. He who
advocates a bureaucratic commission to deal with any dispute between
citizens has had no experience in the struggle to establish truth under
law and has little more to support him than a thesis unsupported by
fact and demonstrated to be impractical by history, let alone its implications toward the surrender of free man's last bulwark against misuse
of governmental power and authority.
Thus far we have seen that a painstaking preparation for the crossexamination of medical experts is an absolute necessity for one who
intends to litigate a medical question. It is also clear that a complete
understanding of medical terms, procedure, and the general relationship between trauma and disease is an essential tool of the advocate.
Illustrations of the value of preparation to minute detail have been
given. Is there, then, more to effective cross-examination than this?
It has been said with reference to cross-examination generally that
it has but one of two objects: first, to destroy the witness, or, second,
to destroy his story. It must be conceded that with professional men

appearing as experts in their specialties, the opportunities of the destruction of the witness is exceedingly limited. It is not suggested that
an effort to destroy the witness, even where he is a physician, ought
not to be undertaken if the facts justify such procedure. However, the
cross-examiner must be certain that a strong case of impeachment or
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dther nicans of destruction of the individual is available and may be
cogently produced before he embarks upon such an adventure. The
examples of the destruction of the witness when dealing with laymen
are legion. Some of them might be here stated without impropriety as
illustrative of the problem.
The ordinary mode of destroying a witness is by direct impeachment-obtaining admissions or introducing other evidence to show
the witness has given prior contradictory and conflicting statements
or was a person whose reputation, habits and the like render him unworthy of belief. Sometimes the same effect may be accomplished by
calling attention to his undesirable or disreputable traits or characteristics. This latter method is aptly illustrated by a criminal ease in
which the late Clarence Darrow was associated in the defense with a
young and overzealous attorney who represented a co-defendant. The
principal witness for the prosecution was an obvious alcoholic. He
appeared on the stand with matted hair, disheveled clothing, and
bloodshot eyes. The tremor of his hands was evident. As the direct
examination progressed, it seemed clear that the witness was making a
favorable impression upon the jury by what he said, and his manner
of saying it. Mr. Darrow's young colleague, grasping at the opportunity to hear himself talk, laboriously took the witness back over his
story item by item and as a net result cemented firmly in the minds of
all twelve of the jurors the probable truth of the witness' story. Darrow, sensing that the jury had either forgotten or had fully discounted
the disreputable appearance of the witness conducted his cross-examination as follows:
"Mr. Witness, stand up."
The witness stood at the witness stand and his appearance was striking. The tremor was plainly seen, he looked through the tangled mat
of hair hanging over his bloodshot eyes with some fear. Darrow then
said, "Mr. Witness, turn to the right." This the witness did with
further trepidation. Darrow then said, "Mr. Witness, turn to the left."
The witness complied. With that, Mr. Darrow said, "That is all, Mr.
Witness. I just wanted this jury to get a good look at you."'3

Many years ago in Chicago a Dr. H was a frequent witness for
defendants in common law personal injury suits. Col. W was by
nature and inclination consistently an attorney for injured plaintiffs.
3The

writer is indebted to the distinguished Francis X. Busch for this anecdote.
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Both Col. W and i)r. -1had been convivial friends for more than
30 years, and it was common knowledge that quantities of alcoholic
beverages had been consumed by each, most of which had occurred
during joint bouts. Col. W presented a case to a jury in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, in which his client had been slightly injured
by a street car. It was contended that as a result of the original injury,
the plaintiff had developed diabetes. One of the able lawyers of that
day at the Chicago Bar, Charles Cunningham, represented the defendant. Col. W developed his facts and called an expert, who, by
hypothesis, testified that upon the given assumed facts it was his opinion that the injury might or could have caused or lighted up a latent
case of diabetes. In cross-examination, Mr. Cunningham established
that the plaintiff had been addicted to the use of alcoholic liquors over
several years. His cross-examination of the plaintiff's expert produced
little of interest, and on defense he called Dr. H. The hypothetical
question propounded by Col. W to his expert was repeated by Mr.
Cunningham to Dr. H; his opinion was sought upon the assumed state
of facts. Dr. H gave it as his opinion that the original injury could not
and did not cause or light up the latent case of diabetes. Mr. Cunningham then added to the hypothesis in the original question the additional fact that the hypothetical individual had been addicted for some
years to the consumption of quantities of acoholic liquors and inquired
whether or not Dr. H had an opinion within the limit of reasonable
medical certainty if the consumption of alcoholic liquors could have
produced or lighted up the diabetes of which complaint was made.
Dr. H gave it as his opinion that the consumption of liquors might,
could, and probably did cause or light up the condition of diabetes.
When turned over to Col. W, the cross-examination progressed
about as follows:
Q: "Dr. H, how long have you known me?"
A: "Why, Col., I think about 30 years."
Q: "Do I have diabetes?"
A: "Why no, Col., I believe not."
Q: "Now, Doc, do you have diabetes?"
A: "Certainly not, Col."
The cross-examiner, then turning to the jury, at that time composed
entirely of men, asked the doctor the following question: "Doctor, if
you do not have diabetes and I do not have diabetes, I should like you

1)6
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to tell these twelve intelligent citizens of this community how it is
4
that whiskey could ever cause diabetes.' '
The distinguished Francis X. Busch, in some of his enlightening
writings and speeches, has referred to his cross-examination of a doctor
who long had appeared as an expert witness in the courts of Chicago.
The witness was well qualified and cross-examination upon the subject
matter of his evidence usually was productive of disaster to the opposition. He was a physician widely known to have treated prominent
citizens of the community. In cross-examination, it is said that Mr.
Busch limited his questions to about the following:
Q: "Did you, Doctor, treat the elder Pullman?"
A: "Yes, I did."
Q: "Where is George Pullman now?"
A: "Dead."
Q: "Did you treat Cyrus McCormick?"
A: "Yes, Sir, I did."
Q: "Where is he now?"
A: "He is dead."
After three or four similar questions, with similar answers, the cross
examination was closed. Reputedly, the expert witness ceased his activity in the courts of Chicago from that time on.
Occasionally the cross-examiner meets an adverse medical witness
who, though fully qualified, exhibits or can be made to exhibit a
pompous attitude. Even though the testimony of such a witness cannot
successfully be attacked by cross examination, substantial damage may
be done to his evidence by highlighting his pomposity. Such a witness
is likely to spend considerable time in making it clear that he is a
person of outstanding accomplishment, deep learning and occupies a
position of great authority in his profession. The cross-examination of
such a witness might well be designed to draw from him extravagant
statements of his attainments with the obvious result that a jury will
discount much of his opinion evidence as being tainted with a similar
egotism.
An example of the cross-examination of such a witness, which is a
part of the legend of the courts of Chicago, is found in the experience
of the late John Bloomingston in a trial in one of the divisions of the
United States District Court many years ago. A distinguished physi4The writer is indebted to Mr. Kenneth B. Hawkins, as an eminent member of the
Chicago Trial bar, for this anecdote.
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cian was called by the opposition to testify hypothetically with reference to a claim to serious disability resulting from injury. The witness' testimony was devastating to Mr. Bloomingston's position. The
witness was such a man as would not concede the slightest possibility
of error in his judgment. Obviously, an effort to cross examine the
witness on his opinions and the subject mater of his evidence would,
in all probability, not only be fruitless, but would make his testimony
more emphatic. In the introduction of the witness on direct examination, he quite willingly, and in some detail, related his vast learning, his
preparation for his specialty, his contribution to the literature of his
profession, and his many professional connections with institutions of
learning and with various hospitals and clinics. In an effort to impress
the jury with the importance of the witness this testimony consumed
about fifteen minutes. When the witness was turned over to Mr.
Bloomingston for cross-examination, because of his acute understanding of the psychology of the courtroom and of those things which
influence jurors, his questioning was limited to the following: "Doctor, I did not hear fully your recitation of your qualifications. Would
you please repeat them?" The doctor then, with a great show of dignity, covered the same ground as was developed in the direct examination. After a period of ten or fiften minutes, which was required
for this repetition of the distinguished attainments of the witness, Mr.
Bloomingston closed the cross-examination with the following question: "Doctor, are you also an Elk?"
The impression may be gained from this illustration that it is advocated that "smart" remarks are helpful, or that a "smart alec" attitude
is approved. Nothing could be further from the intent of the writer.
The purpose of the illustration is to demonstrate that in the occasional
case the obvious conceit and dogmatic attitude of the witness may of
itself bring about his destruction.
While not germane to the cross-examination of experts, it is not
amiss here to consider the demeanor and attitude of the cross-examiner.
It is axiomatic that an abusive and discourteous cross-examination
usually destroys the examiner rather than the witness. It is not suggested that the cross-examiner should adopt a deferential approach.
Quite the contrary. It should appear that counsel has a firm belief in
his position and that there can be "no compromise with wrong." It
must also be borne in mind that each lawyer must develop that method
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and demeanor which is natural to himself. It is usually unwise to attempt to copy the conduct of another.
The testimony of an expert given as opinion evidence must rest
upon the assumption of the truth of the several hypotheses in the
hypothetical question propounded to him. These hypotheses must
find their support in the factual evidence given before the appearance
of the expert. It is frequently true that one or more of the principal
assumptions of fact in the hypothetical question can be attacked.
Thus, in such an instance, the cross-examiner may find a fertile field of
inquiry in drawing from the witness concessions that if such hypotheses were stated otherwise, or were absent from the question, or were
shown to be untrue, the opinion of the expert might be different from
that given in his direct examination. The benefit of such crossexamination derives from one of two circumstances or both. First, if
in the cross-examination of the fact witness, doubt has been cast upon
some of the testimony of such witnesses regarding that evidence which
forms the basis of the hypotheses, it will become evident that a jury,
having discarded as untrue the fact testimony, will, likewise, discard
the conclusion of the expert. Secondly, if the cross-examiner has
available substantial evidence disputing the factual basis for some of
the hypotheses, it is clear that if such evidence is believed by a jury,
the opinion of the expert fails. The competent handling of the crossexamination of an opinion witness in this particular is made most
effective when the court, as it must, instructs or charges the jury that
in the consideration of the opinion evidence the jury must find that the
necessary hypotheses have been established by the factual proof.
Lest it be considered that the foregoing is a criticism of all members
of the medical profession who appear in court as expert witnesses, the
writer hastens to say that such criticism is, in large measure, unjustified. It is suggested that the medical profesison has a duty to furnish to
the courts the benefit of the training, learning, and experience of its
members in the furtherance of, and as an aid to, the administration of
justice. The frequently heard complaint that expert witnesses from
the medical field testify falsely, dependent upon the party who hires
them, is without foundation. It is not contended that doctors do not
occasionally testify to facts or opinions not generally accepted by
their profession. It is insisted, however, that their number is extremely
small. In almost 40 years of experience in the trial courts, the writer
has met no more than three doctors whose testimony was false.
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The trouble lies in the lack of understanding by lawyers of the
questions involved in the particular cases in which medical experts
appear. Given an understanding of the medical question at issue and
the ability to ask the right question, the right answer invariably will be
forthcoming. The ineptitude and pique of counsel is too frequently
the basis of such unfounded complaints.
The shortcomings of expert medical testimony in those jurisdictions
where the opinion of the expert is limited to that which "might or
could" have caused the particular result are not the fault of the medical profession; but, rather, are chargeable to the rules of evidence in
the jurisdictions which require such unsatisfactory testimony. 5 It has
been said that expert testimony is the most undesirable character of
evidence produced in the courts.' Until the courts demand, and the
rules of evidence require, positive testimony rather than "might or
could" opinion from experts, The Bar may not be heard to complain
of medical expert proof. The objection to direct evidence of causal
connection, that it invades the province of the jury, is, to the writer,
completely untenable.
Finally, where there is available to the cross-examiner respectable
medical testimony by several experts of imposing qualifications to
dispute some one or more of the opinions expressed, the cross-examiner
can well plant the seed of doubt by his cross-examination. Given a
successful cross-examination, which either indicates a lack of confidence on the part of the witness in his testimony, or an apparent
exaggeration, the opposing witnesses may be called in direct examination and, if properly prepared, overpower the opinion evidence of the
adversary.
So long as our system of jurisprudence includes the trial of disputes
by jury, just so long will the heart of advocacy continue to be the art
of cross-examination.
5
6

See Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 272 Il. 71, 77, 111 N.E. 499 (1916).
See Opp v. Pryor, 294 I11.538, 545, 128 N.E. 580 (1920).

